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The diversity of state confidentiality laws gov-erning public health data presents a signifi-cant challenge for public health initiatives. 
This challenge is further complicated by the array of 
confidentially laws that are relevant within a state as 
disclosure and usage standards vary depending upon 
data holder, type, and source. These laws often have 
not been updated to address modern confidentiality 
risks such as unlawful data linkage or breach, leaving 
many public health organizations without clear guid-
ance in the contentious area of individual privacy. To 
address these challenges, public health organizations 
have increasingly turned to the science of de-identi-
fication, but whether de-identification adequately 
meets the many and varied state confidentiality legal 
requirements remains an unanswered question.
Understanding De-identification Science
Despite their diverse nature, most public health confi-
dentiality laws share a common theme: the disclosure 
of personal health information is generally prohibited, 
but the disclosure of non-personal health information 
is not. Thus, if personal health information can be ren-
dered non-personal, it may be freely disclosed.1 The 
line between personal and non-personal, however, is 
not easily defined.2 Even national obesity statistics are 
arguably personal; they describe the likelihood any 
given individual represented by the sample group was 
obese during the reporting period. Accordingly, statis-
ticians refer to the science of rendering personal data 
impersonal as statistical disclosure limitation.3
Statistical disclosure limitation attempts to mini-
mize the risk that a disclosure will reveal either the 
identity of, or information about, an individual. Ini-
tially, this science addressed only aggregate or statisti-
cal reports, but, as technology advanced, demand for 
the raw data behind the reports increased. Releasing 
this raw data allowed for greater flexibility and dis-
covery, but also created a greater risk to confidenti-
ality. Raw data is often comprised of a multitude of 
individual records and may include information that 
directly or indirectly identifies individuals. To manage 
this new risk, more sophisticated statistical disclosure 
limitation techniques were needed.4
In 2003, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule took effect, 
establishing a national standard for protecting the 
confidentiality of health care data and addressing 
the challenges presented by the disclosure of record 
level data. Under HIPAA, data containing protected 
health information may be disclosed after it has been 
“de-identified” using one of two methods: safe harbor 
(where 17 specified identifiers are removed) and statis-
tical de-identification (where a statistician determines 
that the “risk is very small that the information could 
be used…to identify an individual”). HIPAA also pro-
vides for the release of a “limited data set,” which is not 
considered de-identified, for research purposes.5
When the HIPAA privacy rule was being drafted, 
however, public health organizations, in recognition of 
their mission and long history of positive data steward-
ship, were exempted from many of its requirements, 
including its de-identification standards.6 States 
were left free to implement and enforce their own 
Victor Richardson, J.D., CIPP/US, is a Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation sponsored Public Health Law Fel-
low stationed at the West Virginia Healthcare Authority. 
Sallie Milam, J.D., CIPP/US/G, is the Chief Privacy Officer 
for the state of West Virginia at the WV Health Care Author-
ity. Denise Chrysler, J.D., is the Director for the Mid-States 
Regional Center of the Network for Public Health Law, located 
at the University of Michigan School of Public Health.
Is Sharing De-identified Data 
Legal? The State of Public Health 
Confidentiality Laws and Their 
Interplay with Statistical Disclosure 
Limitation Techniques
Victor Richardson, Sallie Milam, and Denise Chrysler
84 journal of law, medicine & ethics
JLME SUPPLEMENT
de-identification regimes for public health data, but 
that flexibility had a price. Without prescribed stan-
dards, public health organizations are often unsure if 
and how they can share de-identified data under their 
state confidentiality laws. This uncertainty has been 
exacerbated by recent academic studies attempting to 
demonstrate it is possible to re-identify individuals in 
purportedly confidential data releases.7
The Re-identification Threat
Even when direct identifiers are removed from data, 
it is statistically possible for an attacker to re-estab-
lish identities by discovering pockets of uniqueness 
that remain. Certain combinations of values may be 
so unique that they serve as a “fingerprint” pointing 
to one individual. A re-identification attack attempts 
to locate the unique fingerprints in a purportedly 
confidential dataset and match those fingerprints to 
another dataset containing direct identifiers.8 De-
identification attempts to protect against this risk.
In recent years, researchers have studied techniques 
to re-identify purportedly confidential datasets. These 
studies often report startling high success rates, and 
have caused some scholars to question the efficacy 
of de-identification entirely.10 For example, an often 
cited 2000 study found 87% of the U.S. population 
could be uniquely identified by their combination of 
gender, date of birth, and zip code.11 Even when new 
researchers replicated the study to reflect a growing 
population, they still found 63% of the population 
uniquely identifiable using these variables.12 Out of 
context, these numbers are startling. 
In reality, however, these unique and exact combi-
nations of gender, date of birth, and zip code would 
never be present in a de-identified dataset. Such com-
binations are either generalized or removed entirely, 
drastically reducing the risk of re-identification.13 In 
the latter study above, researchers found the risk of 
unique identification dropped sharply when given 
slightly more abstract data. When they replaced an 
individual’s full date of birth with only the month and 
year, only 4.2% of the population remained uniquely 
identifiable, and when they also replaced zip code 
with county, just 0.2% remained uniquely identifi-
able.14 More impressively, data de-identified using the 
HIPAA safe harbor method is said to present only a 
.04% risk of unique identification.15
Still, the majority of re-identification studies con-
tinue to target data that is not truly de-identified, 
leading to what some call “the myth of easy re-iden-
tification.”16 While academics and scientists debate 
de-identification’s merits, however, a more pertinent 
question has been neglected: is sharing de-identified 
data legal?
The Legality of De-identification Science
Few courts have considered the de-identification and 
disclosure of public health information in light of state 
confidentiality laws, but their decisions provide a win-
dow into the legality of sharing de-identified public 
health data across the country. The governing con-
fidentiality standard differed in each case, but those 
differences proved largely irrelevant. The 
courts in question ultimately based their 
decision on a fact-based determination of 
whether the contested disclosure would 
place the confidentiality of personal health 
information at undue risk.
In Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Depart-
ment of Public Health, the Supreme Court 
of Illinois examined a newspaper’s request 
for cancer registry information concerning 
neuroblastoma incidence by type of cancer, 
zip code, and diagnosis date. The Illinois 
Department of Public Health refused to provide this 
information, citing state confidentiality law that “pre-
cludes disclosure of…‘[t]he identity, or any group of 
facts which tends to lead to the identity, of any per-
son…’” and expert testimony that patients could be 
identified by matching the data requested with pub-
licly available data. 
The court did not find this argument persuasive, 
concluding that “information ‘tends to lead to the 
identity’ of Registry patients only if that information 
can be used by the general public to make those iden-
tifications,” and noting that the expert methodology 
presented was “unique to [the expert’s] education, 
training and experience….” Because the department 
did not produce any evidence that a member of the 
general public could perform the multi-step proce-
dure to match identities, the court ordered the data 
be disclosed.17
In Marine Shale Processors, Inc. v. State of Louisi-
ana, the First Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana 
considered a discovery request for data from a study, 
conducted by the Louisiana Department of Health 
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and Hospitals, involving five cases of neuroblastoma 
found in St. Mary Parish. Narrower in scope than the 
data request in Southern Illinoisan, this data request 
also sought far more granular data, including diag-
nosis date, age at diagnosis, sex, race, religion, family 
medical histories, diagnostic information, treatment, 
and vital status of the patients. This granularity, in 
combination with the small population size, ulti-
mately swayed the court to rule against disclosure. 
Of particular concern to the court was that, due to St. 
Mary Parish’s unusually high incidence of neuroblas-
toma, the identities of the five subjects were already 
generally well known.18
Later in 2004, the same Louisiana court provided 
additional guidance in Williams Law Firm v. Board 
of Supervisors. Here, a law firm requested annualized 
information concerning 21 rare cancers in seven par-
ishes from the Louisiana Tumor Registry. The Registry 
refused to provide the information, relying on state law 
precluding disclosure of “case specific data, as distin-
guished from group, tabular, or aggregate data concern-
ing patients…” to argue that it could not release incident 
rates of one or zero. The firm argued that such values 
would only be case-specific if the population of a given 
parish was one individual. The court found the firm’s 
argument persuasive, holding that, in this case, values of 
zero or one were not identifiable or case specific.19
Thus, although there are relatively few court deci-
sions on point outside of scenarios involving small and 
well-known populations, courts have made it clear 
that they will not forbid disclosures absent real evi-
dence that information can be readily used to re-iden-
tify individuals. Therefore, so long as de-identification 
science meets that burden, it will remain an effective 
and legal means to maintain the confidentiality of per-
sonal health information. 
Conclusion
The science of de-identification con-
tinues to advance, and data de-identi-
fication has become an accepted form 
of protecting the confidentiality of per-
sonal information under federal regula-
tion. At the same time, re-identification 
studies have continued to focus on 
data disclosures that fail to meet any 
modern standard of de-identification. 
Thus, while public health organizations 
may lack specific guidance on how to 
de-identify data in a way permissible 
under their applicable state confidenti-
ality laws, they can reasonably rely on 
the efficacy of modern de-identification 
techniques, so long as the governing 
confidentiality standard allows for the 
disclosure of data that does not identify an individual. 
At the same time, health organizations which intend 
to resist requests for disclosure should be prepared to 
demonstrate why certain data requests could well lead 
to the identification of specific personal information.
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